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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses several significant opinions and legislation of
interest to the Georgia civil trial practitioner issued during the June 1,
2016 to May 31, 2017 survey period.'
II. LEGISLATION

This year, the Georgia General Assembly considered several
significant bills. Trial practitioners should pay close attention to two bills
in particular that were passed and signed into law.
The first is House Bill 192,2 which modified the "business judgment
rule" applicable to directors and officers of banks, trust companies, and
corporations in shareholders' derivative suits or suits on behalf of bank
depositors. For example, section 7-1-4903 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.), which codifies the common law business judgment
rule, was amended to provide that:
There shall be a presumption that the process directors and officers
followed in arriving at decisions was done in good faith and that such
directors and officers have exercised ordinary care; provided, however,
that this presumption may be rebutted by evidence that such process
constitutes gross negligence by being a gross deviation of the standard
of care of a director or officer in a like position under similar
4
circumstances.
Sections 14-2-8305 and 14-2-8426 of the O.C.G.A. were amended to
provide an identical presumption and burden on the plaintiff to prove
gross negligence in order to overcome the presumption. 7 These standards
apply to causes of action arising on or after July 1, 2017.8

1. For an analysis of trial practice and procedure during the prior survey period, see
Brandon L. Peak et al., Trial Practiceand Procedure, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 68
MERCER L. REV. 301 (2016).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 192, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 248 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-490,
14-2-830, 14-2-842 (2017)).
3. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490 (2017).
4. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490(c) (2017); see F.D.I.C. v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579, 591, 761
S.E.2d 332, 341 (2014) (stating "OCGA § 7-1-490(a) is perfectly consistent with the business
judgment rule acknowledged at common law in the decisions of this Court.").
5. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 (2017).
6. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-842 (2017).
7. See O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-830(c) (2017) and 14-2-842(c) (2017).
8. Ga. H.R. Bill 192, § 4, Reg. Sess. (2017).
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The second bill is Senate Bill 126,9 which modifies the venue provision
for suits brought under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA).10 In the
2016 decision Board of Regents v. Jordan,"the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that, under the GTCA, "[I]t is clear that the legislature intended to
allow a tort action to be brought against the State in the county where
economic loss, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and other elements of
actual damages occurred." 12 In Jordan,the alleged negligent act occurred
in Richmond County, but the plaintiff filed suit in DeKalb County, where
he received medical treatment for his injuries.1 3 The court of appeals held
that the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motion to
transfer venue to Richmond County under the GTCA.14
Senate Bill 126 was a reaction to the court's holding in Jordan.Senate
Bill 126 amended O.C.G.A. § 50-21-2815 to provide for causes of action
arising on or after July 1, 2017:
All tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in
the state or superior court of the county wherein the tort giving rise to
the loss occurred; provided, however, that wrongful death actions may
be brought in the county wherein the tort giving rise to the loss occurred
or the county wherein the decedent died.16
III. CASE LAW

A. Apportionment
In Brown v. Tucker,17 the Georgia Court of Appeals clarified Georgia
law and held that a defendant seeking to apportion fault to a nonparty
has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
nonparty's negligence caused some or all of the plaintiffs damages.18 The
plaintiff, Tisha Tucker, was a passenger in a truck driven by the
defendant, Tammy Brown, whose truck collided into the rear of a tractortrailer rig parked by the side of the road. Tucker was injured in the wreck
and the subject lawsuit ensued. The plaintiff opted not to sue the driver
of the tractor-trailer, despite evidence that the tractor-trailer driver was
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Ga. S. Bill 126, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 238 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20-37 (2017).
335 Ga. App. 703, 782 S.E.2d 809 (2016).
Id. at 704, 782 S.E.2d at 811.
Id. at 703, 782 S.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 704, 782 S.E.2d at 811.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 (2017).
Id. (emphasis added).
337 Ga. App. 704, 788 S.E.2d 810 (2016).
Id. at 717, 788 S.E.2d at 821.
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negligent. Prior to trial, the defendant identified the tractor-trailer driver
as a nonparty defendant to whom the jury should apportion fault. 19 At
trial, the defendant "asked the court to charge the jury that she had the
burden of showing [only] a rational basis for apportioning fault to the
nonparty [truck driver]." 20 The court, however, charged the jury that the
defendant must prove the nonparty's negligence caused the plaintiffs
injuries by a preponderance of the evidence. 21
Relying upon language in Levine v. Suntrust Robinson Humphrey,22
the defendant took issue with the burden of proof required by the trial
court's jury charge and argued she need only show a rational basis for
apportioning fault to a nonparty. 23 The court noted that Levine was
inapplicable, 24 and explained that the defendant's rational basis charge
would offer "the jury no guidance about how much evidence the
defendant must produce to meet her burden of assigning fault to a
nonparty." 25
Affirming the trial court's jury charge, the court of appeals explained
that the defendant's attempt to apportion fault to a nonparty "is an
assertion of fact .. . essential to the defense. As an affirmative defense,
the defendant bears the burden of proving her assertion of fact." 26 As with
other affirmative defenses, the court held that it is the defendant's
burden to prove her defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 27
The court of appeals' holding is in line with cases where the affirmative
defense of contributory negligence is asserted. 28 In cases where the
defendant asserts contributory negligence, the defendant has the burden

19. Id. at 704-05, 788 S.E.2d at 813-14. There was evidence presented at trial that
portions of the tractor-trailer were sticking out in the roadway at the time of the collision.

Id.
20. Id. at 714, 788 S.E.2d at 820 (emphasis added).
21. Id. The trial court instructed the jury: "Now, for you to consider the negligence of
the nonparty [tractor-trailer driver], the Defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the negligence of [tractor-trailer driver], if any, was a proximate cause of the
injuries to the Plaintiff." Id.
22. 321 Ga. App. 268, 269, 272, 740 S.E.2d 672, 678 (2013) (stating, in the context of
summary judgment, "it is the defendant's burden to establish a rational basis for
apportioning fault to a nonparty.").
23. Brown, 337 Ga. App. at 716, 788 S.E.2d at 821.
24. The court did not address jury charges in Levine. Instead, the court in Levine
merely addressed whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the
defendant regarding a claim for damages to a business. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 715, 788 S.E.2d at 820.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 716, 788 S.E.2d at 821.
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of proving that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 29 In both
instances, whether a defendant is attempting to establish a contributory
negligence defense or attempting to apportion fault to a nonparty, the
defendant is seeking to have another person bear responsibility for the
plaintiffs damages. 30 Thus, the court reasoned that the defendant's
burden should be the same.3 1 The standard is now clear: the defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the nonparty's fault
was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.

B. Arbitration Clauses
In United Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Norton,32 a unanimous
Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals and held
that an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and a patient was
enforceable against the patient's husband in a wrongful death action. 33
Lola Norton's power of attorney signed an arbitration agreement on her
behalf, requiring arbitration of any disputes arising from her stay at the
nursing home. The Federal Arbitration Act governed the agreement, and
specifically applied to wrongful death claims brought by her beneficiaries
after her death. 34 The court reasoned that the case was "controlled by the
longstanding precedent that a wrongful death action is wholly derivative
of a decedent's right of action." 35 If the deceased has done something that
operates as a bar against his recovery, then that bar will apply equally
to his personal representative after death. 36 For example, a waiver or
release that would bar a decedent's recovery would also bar recovery by
his personal representative. 3 7
Citing Turner v. Walker County,38 the court noted that a defense
available against a decedent in life is also available against his
beneficiaries in a wrongful death action.39 Because the duty to arbitrate
is an affirmative defense and because "any wrongful death claims are
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 300 Ga. 736, 797 S.E.2d 825 (2017).
33. Id. at 736, 797 S.E.2d at 826.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 737, 797 S.E.2d at 827.
36. Id. at 738, 797 S.E.2d at 827.
37. Id.
38. 200 Ga. App. 565, 408 S.E.2d 818 (1991).
39. Norton, 300 Ga. at 738, 797 S.E.2d at 827. In Turner, the decedent signed a
covenant not to sue, and the court held that the defendant could assert the defense of the
covenant not to sue against the wrongful death beneficiaries. Turner, 200 Ga. App. at 566,
408 S.E.2d at 819.
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wholly derivative of claims Lola could have pursued, the requirement to
arbitrate [was] also a viable defense against Lola's wrongful death
beneficiaries." 4 0 Although the court used broad language to declare that
a wrongful death case is derivative of the decedent's own personal injury
claim, it is unclear how far that principle extends. 41 The court specifically
declined to address whether wrongful death beneficiaries would be
barred by "procedural defenses" available against the decedent or barred
only by "substantive defenses." 42
C. Choice of Law
In Coon v. Medical Center, Inc.,43 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
"where a claim in a Georgia lawsuit is governed by the common law, and
the common law is also in force in the other state [where the tort was
committed], the common law as determined by Georgia's courts will
control."44 Explaining the origin of this "approach" to common law choiceof-law questions (which is sometimes referred to as the "presumption of
identity"), 45 the court explained that "the prevailing view at the time the
doctrine was established [by the court] was that there is one common law
that can be properly discerned by wise judges, not multiple common laws
by which judges make law for their various jurisdictions." 46 While
acknowledging that this approach "may seem anachronistic to lawyers
and judges trained and professionally steeped in relativist theories of
legal realism,"4 7 the court, citing Georgia decisions dating as far back as
the 1880s, emphasized that "[u]ntil it becomes clear that a better rule
exists, we will adhere to our traditional approach." 48
Coon involves a tragic set of facts. Coon, an Alabama resident, was
pregnant. She traveled to a hospital in Georgia for a checkup and learned
that her unborn baby did not have a heartbeat. She delivered the
stillborn baby at the Georgia hospital. Another stillborn baby had also
recently been delivered at the hospital. During the process of preparing
the two babies' remains to be sent to the hospital morgue, hospital

.

40. Norton, 300 Ga. at 739, 797 S.E.2d at 828.
41. Id. at 737, 797 S.E.2d at 827.
42. Id. at 739 n.4, 797 S.E.2d at 828 n.4.
43. 300 Ga. 722, 797 S.E.2d 828 (2017).
44. Id. at 723, 797 S.E.2d at 829.
45. Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Fort Benning Family Cmtys., LLC, No. 4:15-CV-75-CDL, 2017
LEXIS 76913, at *1 (M.D. Ga. May 15, 2017) (stating "In Coon, the Georgia Supreme Court
expressly embraced the presumption of identity. .
46. Coon, 300 Ga. at 730, 797 S.E.2d at 834.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 733, 797 S.E.2d at 836.
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workers placed the wrong identifying information on the babies. Coon
eventually returned to Alabama and had a funeral for her baby; however,
the baby she buried was not hers. The Georgia hospital notified Coon of
the hospital's mistake by telephone two weeks after the funeral. 49 Coon
received the telephone call in Alabama. 50
Coon asserted a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
against the Georgia hospital in a Georgia court. The hospital moved for
summary judgment and argued that Georgia law regarding negligent
infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to have suffered a
"physical impact." Coon, in contrast, argued that Alabama law applied
because she received the hospital's telephone call in Alabama. Coon
contended summary judgment could not be entered because Alabama's
common law cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
does not require a physical impact. The trial court ultimately concluded
that Georgia law applied because application of Alabama law would have
conflicted with public policy embodied in Georgia's physical impact rule.5 1
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed for the same reason. 52
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed for a different reason. 53 The
court explained that, "[f]rom the beginning, . . . Georgia court[s] [have]
appl[ied] the common law as expounded by the courts of Georgia" when
adjudicating claims arising out of states "where the common law is in
force." 54 Although Coon argued that the court should reject this "archaic"
rule, the court disagreed.55 Instead, the court emphasized that "a
precedent's antiquity is a factor that weighs in favor of adhering to it."56
D. Foreseeability
In Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B.,57 the plaintiff, a patient
of the defendant dental practice, was sexually assaulted by a registered
nurse anesthetist, Paul Serdula, while under anesthesia during a dental
49. Id. at 723 n.25, 797 S.E.2d at 830 n.25.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 725-26, 797 S.E.2d at 831-32.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 728, 797 S.E.2d at 833.
54. Id. at 729, 797 S.E.2d at 834. The common law is "in force" in any state that "was
one of, or formed from the territory of one of, the original 13 colonies that inherited the
common law of England." Id. at 731 n.5, 797 S.E.2d at 834 n.5. The Georgia Supreme Court
left open the question as to whether it would follow the approach described in Coon when
adjudicating claims arising out of a state that was not formed from one of the original
thirteen colonies. See generally id.
55. Id. at 733, 797 S.E.2d at 836.
56. Id.
57. 300 Ga. 840, 797 S.E.2d 87 (2017).
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procedure. The defendant hired Serdula as an independent contractor
through an anesthesia staffing agency, which conducted an independent
credentialing process on Serdula before he was placed with the dental
practice. The plaintiff sued both the dental practice and Serdula, but
dropped her claims against Serdula after he pled guilty to numerous
criminal charges and was sentenced to life in prison.58 At trial, the
defendant dental practice sought a directed verdict on plaintiffs claims
for professional negligence and negligence per se. The practice argued
that the plaintiff could not show proximate cause because Serdula's
intervening criminal acts were not foreseeable to the defendant, and
because the plaintiffs injuries-sexual assault-were not within the
class of harm the dental anesthesia statute, O.C.G.A. § 43-11-21.1,59
intended to guard against.6 0
The trial court denied the motion and the jury rendered a verdict
against the dental practice for both professional negligence and
negligence per se. 61 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict,
concluding that whether Serdula's criminal acts were foreseeable was a
matter for the jury, and that a different statute in the same chapter as
the dental anesthesia statute provided broad protections for the "health,
safety, and welfare" of dental patients. Therefore, the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff were within the harms protected against by the dental
anesthesia statute. 62
The Georgia

Supreme Court disagreed with both rulingS 63 and

reaffirmed the longstanding rule that, when an intervening and
independent wrongful act of a third person produces an injury, the
intervening act is treated as the proximate cause of the injury unless the
defendant had reason to anticipate, apprehend, or foresee the
independent wrongful act.64 However, the supreme court disagreed with

the court of appeals' conclusion that there was evidence from which a jury
could conclude that Serdula's criminal acts were foreseeable. 65 Absent
evidence that the defendant dental practice knew of previous assaults by
Serdula, a general understanding among the dental industry of the
possibility of sexual assaults while patients are under anesthesia is not

58. Id. at 841, 794 S.E.2d at 89.
59. O.C.G.A. § 43-11-21.1 (2017).
60. Goldstein, Garber & Salama LLC v. J.B., 335 Ga. App. 416, 418, 779 S.E.2d 484,
488 (2015).
61. Id.
62. Goldstein, 300 Ga. at 845-46, 774 S.E.2d at 92.
63. Id. at 840, 774 S.E.2d at 88.
64. Id. at 841-42, 774 S.E.2d at 89-90.
65. Id. at 843, 774 S.E.2d at 90.
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sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Serdula's acts were
foreseeable.66
The supreme court also rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that
sexual assault was a harm that O.C.G.A. § 43-11-21.1 intended to guard
against.6 7 Instead, the court concluded that it intended to guard against
medical complications arising from the improper use of anesthesia due to
inadequate equipment, training, or experience.68 Because sexual assault
was a remote and non-medical injury, the court concluded that the
defendant dental practice's actions could not constitute negligence per se,
and the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant.69
E. Pre-suit Offers to Settle PersonalInjury Claims
In 2013, the Georgia General Assembly enacted O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1,70
which governs pre-suit offers to settle personal injury claims arising from
the use of a motor vehicle.7 1 Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Woodard72 is
the first case to interpret the statute. The statute contains several
"material terms" that must be included in every pre-suit offer. 73 It also
provides that the offeree "may accept the [material terms] by providing
written acceptance[.]"74 Through their attorney, the plaintiffs sent a
demand letter under the new statute, but added several terms beyond
those the statute required.7 5 Most importantly, the letter made both
acceptance in writing and timely payment of the demand conditions of
acceptance.76
In response to the Woodards' demand, Grange sent its written
acceptance within the time period the letter required. Grange generated
the checks within the deadline but, due to what appeared to be a
computer error, the address on the checks was wrong, and the Woodards'
attorney never received them. The Woodards rejected Grange's attempt
to issue new checks as an untimely settlement offer, and Grange sued in

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
67.1).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 842-83, 774
Id. at 844-45, 774
Id. at 846-47, 774
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 336,

S.E.2d at 90.
S.E.2d at 91-92.
S.E.2d at 92-93.
Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 271, § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 (2017).
300 Ga. 848, 797 S.E.2d 814 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(a) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b) (2017).
Woodard, 300 Ga. at 848-49, 797 S.E.2d at 816-17.
Id.
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federal court to enforce what it contended was a binding settlement
agreement. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
Grange argued that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 made written acceptance the
sole means of accepting an offer. Grange further contended the statute
did not permit the plaintiff to create a unilateral contract, that is,
contracts that require full performance to accept the contract. The
Woodards, however, contended that nothing in the statute prohibited
them from contracting in the manner permitted by Georgia law. The
district court ruled the statute did permit unilateral contracts that made
timely payment a condition of acceptance, and held that no settlement
contract was formed because Grange failed to make a timely payment.
Grange appealed.77
On certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether O.C.G.A. § 9-1167.1 permitted pre-suit offers that required acceptance in the form of
performance and, more specifically, whether the statute permitted a
demand that made timely payment a condition of acceptance.78 To
interpret the statute, the supreme court applied several "background
principles of law."7 9 Statutory text must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning and read "in its most natural and reasonable way." 8 0 "[C ritical
to [the court's] understanding of the statute" is the principle that "[a]ll
statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full
knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it."81
The court then discussed the existing condition of law regarding the
formation of contracts. 82 "There is no enforceable settlement between
parties absent mutual agreement between them." 83 A contract is not
created unless the offer is "accepted unequivocally and without variance
of any sort." 84 Further, "an offeror is the master of his or her offer, and
free to set the terms thereof." 85 It was with this background that the court
turned to the statute itself. Section 9-11-67.1 provides:

77. Id. at 849-50, 797 S.E.2d at 817-18.
78. Id. at 851, 797 S.E.2d at 818.
79. Woodard, 300 Ga. at 852, 797 S.E.2d at 818-19.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Botts v. Se. Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689, 700-01, 10 S.E.2d 375, 382
(1940)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 852, 797 S.E.2d at 819.
84. Id. (quoting Frickley v. Jones, 280 Ga. 573, 574, 630 S.E.2d 374, 376 (2006)).
85. Id. at 853, 797 S.E.2d at 819 (quoting Atkinson v. Cook, 271 Ga. 57, 58, 518 S.E.2d
413, 414 (1999)).
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(a) Prior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for
personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor
vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf
of a claimant or claimants shall be in writing and contain the following
material terms:
(1) The time period within which such offer must be accepted, which
shall be not less than 30 days from receipt of the offer;
(2) Amount of monetary payment;
(3) The party or parties the claimant or claimants will release if such
offer is accepted;
(4) The type of release, if any, the claimant or claimants will provide
to each releasee; and
(5) The claims to be released.
(b) The recipients of an offer to settle made under this Code section
may accept the same by providing written acceptance of the material
terms outlined in subsection (a) of this Code section in their entirety.
(c) Nothing in this Code section is intended to prohibit parties from
reaching a settlement agreement in a manner and under terms
otherwise agreeable to the parties.

(g) Nothing in this Code section shall prohibit a party making an offer
to settle from requiring payment within a specified period; provided,
however, that such period shall be not less than ten days after the
86
written acceptance of the offer to settle.
A seven-judge majority held that this statute did not "expressly or by
necessary implication" displace Georgia's common law contract
principles.87 The court held that subsection (a), which provides five
material terms for offers made under the statute, was non-exclusive. 88
In other words, "[e]very Pre-Suit Offer must contain the five enumerated
terms, but additional terms are not prohibited."89 The court cited several
reasons why the subsection (a) terms were not the only terms permitted

86. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1.
87. Woodard, 300 Ga. at 854, 797 S.E.2d at 820.
88. Id. at 855, 797 S.E.2d at 820.
89. Id.
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in the pre-suit offer.90 First, the statute did not explicitly state that no
other terms could be included in the offer.9 1 Second, subsection (g)
explicitly contemplated that an offer could require payment within a
certain number of days, which was just one example of a term not
enumerated in subsection (a) that an offeror could include in his pre-suit
offer. 92 Third, subsection (c) allowed the parties to make offers both "in a
manner" and "under terms" upon which they agreed. 93 "[T]he use of the
word 'manner' in subsection (c) indicates that not only are additional
'terms' permissible, but a claimant may ask the recipient of a Pre-Suit
Offer to do something to accept the offer beyond stating the recipient's
acceptance in writing." 94 Thus, unilateral contracts that require
acceptance in the form of performance are permissible under the statute.
In short, acceptance under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 requires written
acceptance of the five terms enumerated in subsection (a); but while that
written acceptance is necessary, "whether it is sufficient depends on the
offer."9 5
The court declined to answer questions that required it to apply the
law to the facts of the case.96 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit resolved the
remaining issues, holding that the Woodards made timely payment a
condition of acceptance, and Grange failed to timely accept the offer when
it did not deliver the checks within the required deadline. 97 Therefore, no
binding settlement agreement was created under the statute.9 8
F. Statutes of Limitation & Tolling
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a statute tolling the
statute of limitations for "any cause of action in tort that may be brought
by the victim of an alleged crime" 99 so long as the victim's torts claims
"arise[] out of the facts and circumstances"100 related to an alleged crime
committed in Georgia.10 1 Under the statute, the tolling period runs from

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 855, 797 S.E.2d at 820-21.
Id. at 855, 797 S.E.2d at 821 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(c)).

94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
Act 20,
100.
101.

Id. at 856, 797 S.E.2d at 821.
Id. at 858, 797 S.E.2d at 823.
Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 861 F.3d 1224, 1233 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005, Ga. H.R. Bill 172, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws
§ 2 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99). The Act became effective July 1, 2005. Id. § 8.
Id.
Id.
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the date of the alleged crime or act giving rise to the tort action "until the
prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise
terminated."102

A frequently-litigated issue became whether the tolling statute
applied only to a crime victim's tort claims against the person accused of
committing the crime that gave rise to those tort claims. The answer,
according to a series of Georgia Court of Appeals decisions handed down
between 2007 and 2015, was yes. 103 However, in Harrisonv. McAfee, 104
a case decided during the survey period, the court of appeals overturned
those prior decisions.105

In June 2011, plaintiff Harrison was at the Shamrock bar in Macon,
Georgia, when a group of masked robbers burst into the bar and shot
him. The shooter escaped and still remains at large. In August 2013,
more than two years after Harrison was shot, he filed a premises liability
action against Dargan McAfee, the alleged owner of the Shamrock, to
recover for his personal injuries. Harrison then amended his complaint
twice: first, to allege tolling under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99106 applied given his
status as a crime victim and, second, to add a corporation McAfee formed
to own the bar. 107 The defendants moved for summary judgment,
contending that Harrison's claims were time-barred because neither
McAfee nor his corporation shot Harrison. In granting the defendants'
motion, the trial court rejected Harrison's argument that the Georgia
Court of Appeals misconstrued the crime victims tolling statute by
holding that it applied only to crime victims' actions against alleged
perpetrators. Harrison appealed.108
Sitting en banc, the court of appeals overruled its prior decisions and
held that the crime victims tolling statute "applies regardless of whether
the defendant in the case has been accused of committing the crime from
which the cause of action arises."109 The court reversed the trial court and
revived Harrison's tort claims. 110
102. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 (2017) (emphasis added). The statute caps the length of the
tolling period at six years for all alleged crimes or tortious acts except for "childhood sexual
abuse." Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1(a)(1) (defining childhood sexual abuse); O.C.G.A. §
9-3-33.1(b)(2)(A) (extending time to file civil actions for childhood sexual abuse committed
after July 1, 2015).
103. See Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 395-97, 788 S.E.2d 872, 874-75 (2016).
104. 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872 (2016).
105. Id. at 401, 788 S.E.2d at 878.
106. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 (2017).
107. Harrison,338 Ga. App. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873-74.
108. Id. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 874.
109. Id. at 394, 395, 402, 788 S.E.2d at 874, 879.
110. Id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 879.
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Harrison, written by now Georgia Supreme Court Justice Nels
Peterson, is important for at least two reasons. First, the statute of
limitations for crime victims who have tort claims arising out of those
crimes is tolled until the criminal prosecution is final or otherwise
terminated. That change will have a significant impact on statute of
limitations defenses in numerous tort cases. Second, Harrisonoverruled
the prior cases interpreting the statute because they were at odds with
the statute's plain meaning. In doing so, the court explained that the
principle of stare decisis does not necessarily preclude the court from
changing course and correcting wayward statutory interpretations.111
That reasoning, endorsed in full by twelve of the fourteen judges on the
panel, is generally applicable. 112

G. The "One Bite" Rule
There are no more "free bites" in Georgia. In Steagald v. Eason,113 the
Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Georgia Court of
Appeals and held that Georgia law does not require proof or knowledge
of an actual prior dog bite to hold a defendant responsible for a dog bite
injury. 114 In dog bite cases, Georgia's "first bite rule" requires the plaintiff
to present evidence that the defendant (dog owner or dog keeper) had
knowledge of the dog's dangerous or vicious nature prior to the dog biting
the plaintiff. 115 In the past, Georgia courts have interpreted this to mean
that "the dog must have, on a prior occasion, done the same act which
resulted in the injury comprising the tort action."1 16 The court expressly
disapproved of this interpretation in Steagald.117 In Steagald, the court
held that it could infer the defendant's requisite knowledge (of a dog's
dangerous propensity to bite someone) from a dog's behavior other than
an actual previous bite.11 8
In Steagald, plaintiffs neighbor's dog "Rocks" bit her while in her
neighbor's yard. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries, and the subject

111. See id. at 400-02, 788 S.E.2d at 877-78.
112. Id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 878.
113. 300 Ga. 717, 797 S.E.2d 838 (2017).
114. Id. at 719, 797 S.E.2d at 840.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 841 (emphasis added) (quoting Hamilton v. Walker, 235
Ga. App. 635, 635, 510 S.E.2d 120, 121 (1998)).
117. Id. The supreme court disapproved of the holding in Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga.
App. 635, 510 S.E.2d 120 (1998), a prior 4-3 split decision by the court of appeals. Steagald,
300 Ga. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 841.
118. Steagald, 300 Ga. at 720-21, 797 S.E.2d at 840.
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lawsuit ensued. 119 There was no evidence that Rocks had bitten anyone
prior to biting the plaintiff.120 There was, however, evidence the
defendants had knowledge that the dog previously "growled and
snapped" at others. 121 The plaintiffs relied on those previous "snapping
incidents" as proof the defendants knew the dog had a dangerous
propensity to bite. 122 The trial court found there was no evidence the
defendants "had reason to know the dog to be vicious or dangerous," 123
and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 124
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court and concluded "the
snapping incidents [were] not sufficient proof of knowledge."125 Reversing
the court of appeals, the supreme court held the dog's previous acts of
snapping at people amounted to an attempted dog bite, which "[Miost
certainly may be proof of a propensity to bite." 126 In reaching this
conclusion, the court drew on cases outside the dog bite context and
analogized a dog owner's duty to that of an employer in negligent hiring
or retention cases. 127 The requisite knowledge of an employer can be
inferred so long as "it is reasonably foreseeable from the employee's
'tendencies' or propensities that the employee could cause the type of
harm sustained by the plaintiff."1 28 The court reasoned that a dog owner's
requisite knowledge can be similarly established. 129
To establish a dog owner's knowledge of a dog's dangerous
propensities, the plaintiff does not have to prove "an incident involving
the exact same conduct and the exact same injury" occurred.1 30 Rather,
to infer the dog owner's requisite knowledge, the plaintiff need only show

119. Id. at 718, 797 S.E.2d at 839-40.
120. Id. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 841.
121. Id. at 718, 797 S.E.2d at 839. About a week prior to biting the plaintiff, Rocks
"growled and snapped" at one of the defendants, Cheryl Eason, while she was trying to feed
the dog. Id. There was also evidence that Cheryl Eason, on the same day, "observed Rocks
growling, barking, and snapping at Gary [Steagald]" as he reached his hand near the dog's
pen. Id.
122. Id. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 841.
123. Id. at 717-18, 797 S.E.2d at 839.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 841.
126. Id. at 720-21, 797 S.E.2d at 841.
127. Id. at 719-20, 797 S.E.2d at 840-41.
128. Id. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 840-41 (quoting Munro v. Univ. Health Servs., 277 Ga.
861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2004)).
129. Id. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 841 (quoting Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 67,
432 S.E.2d 658, 660 (1993)).
130. Id. at 720, 797 S.E.2d at 841 (quoting Torrance, 209 Ga. App. at 67, 432 S.E.2d at
660).
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the defendant's knowledge of a prior "incident that would cause a prudent
person to anticipate the actual incident that caused the injury." 131
H. Uninsured/UnderinsuredMotorist Coverage
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Morgan,132 the Georgia
Court of Appeals granted an application for interlocutory review to
consider whether, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1), 133 Wanda and
Victor Morgan's policy of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM)
coverage with GEICO provided the default amount of UM coverage,
namely, an amount equal to the policy's liability limits, or the statutory
minimum amount of $25,000.134 The trial court "rul[ed] as a matter of
law that the Morgans' policy provided UM coverage with a limit of
$100,000 per person," 135 finding, "There [was] no evidence [the Morgans]
affirmatively chose a lower amount of coverage." 13 6 The court of appeals
affirmed. 137
Section 33-7-11(a)(1) of the O.C.G.A., as amended in 2001, "require[s]
insurance policies issued in Georgia to contain provisions for UM
coverage which at the option of the insured shall be (i) not less than
$25,000 per person, or (ii) equal to the policy's bodily injury liability
insurance coverage." 138 "The 2001 amendment was intended to make a
policy's liability limits the default provision for UM coverage, unless an
insured affirmatively elects UM coverage in a lesser amount."13 9
Although, "Georgia law requires insurers to provide UM coverage ...
unless the insured rejects the coverage in writing," 140 section 33-711(a)(1) of the O.C.G.A. does not contain a "specific requirement that an
insured's affirmative election of a lesser amount of UM coverage must be
made in writing." 4 1 An insurer contending a "lesser coverage should be
enforced instead of the statutory default coverage[]" has the "burden of

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
S.E.2d
140.
141.

Id. (quoting Kringle v. Elliott, 301 Ga. App. 1, 2, 686 S.E.2d 665, 666 (2009)).
341 Ga. App. 396, 800 S.E.2d 612 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (2017).
Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 341 Ga. App. at 397, 800 S.E.2d at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398, 800 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 399, 800 S.E.2d at 614 (quoting Soufi v. Haygood, 282 Ga. App. 593, 595, 639
395, 397-98 (2006)).
Id. at 398, 800 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 399, 800 S.E.2d at 614.
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showing that [the insured] did in fact make an affirmative choice of lesser
coverage." 142
Of particular importance to the practitioner is GEICO's argument that
"the Morgans' [prior] written rejections of UM coverage .

.

. limit their

UM claim to the statutory minimum coverage amount of $25,000."143
Citing O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(3), which has been interpreted as "an
exception to Subsection (a)(1)'s requirement that an insurer offer UJM
coverage each time a policy is issued or delivered,"1 4GEICO contended,
"Subsection (a)(1) offers an insured a 'one-time option' of obtaining UM
coverage either at the $25,000 statutory minimum or at an amount equal
to the policy's liability coverage limits ... even if the insured later chooses
to add UM coverage to the policy." 145 The court of appeals rejected
GEICO's argument, stating "the exception set forth in Subsection (a)(3)
applies only 'absent a request' for UM coverage. The exception does not
apply where .

.

. an insured who previously rejected UM coverage later

requests that UM coverage be added to the policy." 146 In other words, "the
default provision applies whenever the insured obtains UM coverage,
whether that occurs when the insured first buys the policy or when the
insured requests UM coverage at some later date-unless the insured
affirmatively chooses a lower limit."1

47

L Venue
In PandoraFranchising,LLC v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP,148 the
Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the Georgia Court of
Appeals correctly interpreted the removal provision under Georgia's
corporate venue statute, O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4).149 According to
subsection (b)(4), domestic and foreign corporations authorized to
transact business in Georgia are subject to venue "in the county where
50
the cause of action originated."o
However, "[i]f venue is based solely on
this paragraph, the defendant shall have the right to remove the action
to the county in Georgia where the defendant maintains its principal
place of business."151 The question in Pandorawas whether a foreign

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 399, 800 S.E.2d at 615.
Id.
Id. at 400, 800 S.E.2d at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.
299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) (2017).
Id.
Id.
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corporation, whose principal place of business is admittedly located in
another state, 152 has the right of removal under subsection (b)(4).1 5 3
Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP (Kingdom) sued Pandora Franchising,
LLC (Pandora) in Thomas County pursuant to subsection (b)(4), alleging
"this is the county where the cause of action originated."1 54 Citing the
same O.C.G.A. section, Pandora filed a notice of removal seeking to
"remove the complaint to Gwinnett County where, Pandora claimed ...
'it maintains its registered office as its principal place of business in
Georgia."1 5 5 The trial court granted Pandora's request. 56 "The court of
appeals granted Kingdom's application for interlocutory review and
reversed the grant of removal."157 The supreme court granted certiorari
to determine whether "only a corporation with its worldwide principal
place of business, or 'nerve center' in Georgia has the right to remove the
claim to the county in Georgia where that principal place of business is
located."15 8
Pandora contended, "the legislature meant to permit a company such
as itself, which maintains its worldwide principal place of business in a
place other than Georgia, to remove such a claim to the county in which
it maintains its Georgia principal place of business." 59 The supreme
court disagreed, stating that the legislature intended the right of transfer
provided by subsection (b)(4) be conferred only to a corporation who
maintains its worldwide principal place of business in Georgia.160 In
other words, foreign corporations do not have a right of removal under
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), and the action can be maintained in the county
where the cause of action originated.'1 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The above cases and legislation have, in the Authors' estimation,
significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia during the

152. Pandora,299 Ga. at 723-24, 791 S.E.2d at 787. "In its application for certificate of
authority to transact business in Georgia, Pandora identifies its principal place of business
as being located in Maryland." Id.
153. Id. at 726, 791 S.E.2d at 788.
154. Id. at 724, 791 S.E.2d at 787.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 726, 791 S.E.2d at 789.
161. See id. at 727, 791 S.E.2d at 789 (stating "If [a defendant's worldwide principal
place of business] is not located in a Georgia county, then no right to remove is granted.").
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survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be exhaustive of
all legal developments for this topic.
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